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Abstract
We propose a novel approach for generating unrestricted
adversarial examples by manipulating fine-grained aspects
of image generation. Unlike existing unrestricted attacks
that typically hand-craft geometric transformations, we
learn stylistic and stochastic modifications leveraging state-
of-the-art generative models. This allows us to manipulate
an image in a controlled, fine-grained manner without be-
ing bounded by a norm threshold. Our model can be used
for both targeted and non-targeted unrestricted attacks. We
demonstrate that our attacks can bypass certified defenses,
yet our adversarial images look indistinguishable from nat-
ural images as verified by human evaluation. Adversarial
training can be used as an effective defense without degrad-
ing performance of the model on clean images. We perform
experiments on LSUN and CelebA-HQ as high resolution
datasets to validate efficacy of our proposed approach.
1. Introduction
Adversarial examples, inputs resembling real samples
but maliciously crafted to mislead machine learning mod-
els, have been studied extensively in the last few years.
Most of the existing papers, however, focus on norm-
constrained attacks and defenses, in which the adversarial
input lies in the -neighborhood of a real sample using the
Lp distance metric (commonly with p = 0, 2,∞). For small
, the adversarial input is quasi-indistinguishable from the
natural sample. For an adversarial image to fool the human
visual system, it is sufficient to be norm-constrained; but
this condition is not necessary. Moreover, defenses tailored
for norm-constrained attacks can fail on other subtle input
modifications [15]. This has led to a recent surge of interest
on unrestricted adversarial attacks in which the adversary
is not restricted by a norm threshold. These methods typ-
ically hand-craft transformations to capture visual similar-
ity. Spatial transformations [15, 56, 1], viewpoint or pose
changes [2], inserting small patches [7], among other meth-
ods, have been proposed to generate unrestricted adversarial
examples.
In this paper, we focus on fine-grained manipulation of
images for unrestricted adversarial attacks. Building upon
the Style-GAN model [26] which disentangles fine and
coarse-grained variations of images, we manipulate stylistic
and stochastic latent variables in order to mislead a clas-
sification model. Loss of the target classifier is used to
learn subtle variations to create adversarial examples. The
pre-trained generative model constrains the search space to
natural-looking images. We verify that we do not deviate
from the space of realistic images with a user study using
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Finally, we demonstrate that our
proposed attack can break certified defenses, revealing new
vulnerabilities of existing approaches. Adversarial training
can be used as an effective defense, and unlike training on
norm-bounded adversarial examples, it does not decrease
accuracy on clean images. We elaborate on the proposed
approach in Section 3.
2. Related Work
2.1. Norm-constrained Adversarial Examples
Most of the existing works on adversarial attacks and
defenses focus on norm-constrained adversarial examples:
for a given classifier F : Rn → {1, . . . ,K} and an image
x ∈ Rn, the adversarial image x′ ∈ Rn is created such
that ‖x− x′‖p <  and F (x) 6= F (x′). Common val-
ues for p are 0, 2,∞, and  is chosen small enough so that
the perturbation is imperceptible. Various algorithms have
been proposed for creating x′ from x. Optimization-based
methods solve a surrogate optimization problem based on
the classifier’s loss and the perturbation norm. In their pio-
neering paper on adversarial examples, Szegedy et al. [48]
use box-constrained L-BFGS [16] to minimize the surro-
gate loss function. Carlini and Wagner [9] propose stronger
optimization-based attacks for L0, L2 and L∞ norms us-
ing better objective functions and the Adam optimizer [28].
Deep-Fool is introduced in [36] as a non-targeted attack op-
timized for the L2 distance. It iteratively computes a mini-
mal norm adversarial perturbation for a given image by lin-
early approximating the decision function. Gradient-based
methods use gradient of the classifier’s loss with respect
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to the input image. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
[18] uses a first-order approximation of the function for
faster generation, and is optimized for the L∞ norm. Pro-
jected Gradient Descent (PGD) [35] is an iterative variant of
FGSM which provides a strong first-order attack by using
multiple steps of gradient ascent and projecting perturbed
images to an -ball centered at the input. Other variants of
FGSM are proposed in [13, 29]. Jacobian-based Saliency
Map Attack (JSMA) [39] is a greedy algorithm that modi-
fies pixels one at a time. It uses the gradients to compute a
saliency map, picks the most important pixel and modifies it
to increase likelihood of the target class. Li et al. [32] intro-
duce a gradient transformer module to generate regionally
homogeneous perturbations. They claim state-of-the-art at-
tack results, which are independent of input images and can
be transferred to black-box models. Generative attack meth-
ods [4, 40, 55] use an auxiliary network to learn adversarial
perturbations, which provides benefits such as faster infer-
ence and more diversity in the synthesized images.
Several methods have been proposed for defending
against adversarial attacks. These approaches can be
broadly categorized to empirical defenses which are em-
pirically robust to adversarial examples, and certified de-
fenses which are provably robust to a certain class of at-
tacks. One of the most successful empirical defenses is ad-
versarial training [18, 29, 35] which augments training data
with adversarial examples generated as the training pro-
gresses. Adversarial logit pairing [24] is a form of adver-
sarial training which constrains logit predictions of a clean
image and its adversarial counterpart to be similar. Many
empirical defenses attempt to defeat adversaries using a
form of input pre-processing or by manipulating interme-
diate features or gradients [31, 19, 57, 44, 33, 58]. Few
approaches have been able to scale up to high-resolution
datasets such as ImageNet [57, 33, 58, 42, 24]. Most of the
proposed heuristic defenses were later broken by stronger
adversaries [9, 51, 3]. Athalye et al. [3] show that many of
these defenses fail due to an issue they term obfuscated gra-
dients, which occurs when the defense method is designed
to mask information about the model’s gradients. They pro-
pose workarounds to obtain approximate gradients for ad-
versarial attacks. Vulnerabilities of empirical defenses have
led to increased interest in certified defenses, which provide
a guarantee that the classifier’s prediction is constant within
a neighborhood of the input. Several certified defenses have
been proposed [54, 43, 14, 50] which typically do not scale
to ImageNet. Cohen et al. [10] use randomized smoothing
with Gaussian noise to obtain provably L2-robust classifiers
on ImageNet.
2.2. Unrestricted Adversarial Examples
For an image to be adversarial, it needs to be visually in-
distinguishable from real images. One way to achieve this
is by applying subtle geometric transformations to the in-
put image. Spatially transformed adversarial examples are
introduced in [56] in which a flow field is learned to dis-
place pixels of the image. They use sum of spatial move-
ment distance for adjacent pixels as a regularization loss to
minimize the local distortion introduced by the flow field.
Similarly, Alaifari et al. [1] iteratively apply small defor-
mations, found through a gradient descent step, to the input
in order to obtain the adversarial image. Engstrom et al.
[15] show that simple translations and rotations are enough
for fooling deep neural networks. This remains to be the
case even when the model has been trained using appropri-
ate data augmentation. Alcorn et al. [2] manipulate pose
of an object to fool deep neural networks. They estimate
parameters of a 3D renderer that cause the target model
to misbehave in response to the rendered image. Another
approach for evading the norm constraint is to insert new
objects in the image. Adversarial Patch [7] creates an ad-
versarial image by completely replacing part of an image
with a synthetic patch. The patch is image-agnostic, ro-
bust to transformations, and can be printed and used in real-
world settings. Song et al. [46] search in the latent (z)
space of AC-GAN [38] to find generated images that can
fool a classifier, and show results on MNIST [30], SVHN
[37] and CelebA [34] datasets. Since the z space is not in-
terpretable, their method has no control over the generation
process. On the other hand, our method can manipulate real
or synthesized images in a fine-grained, controllable man-
ner. Existence of on-the-manifold adversarial examples is
also shown in [17], which considers the task of classify-
ing between two concentric n-dimensional spheres. A chal-
lenge for creating unrestricted adversarial examples and de-
fending against them is introduced in [6] using the simple
task of classifying between birds and bicycles.
2.3. Fine-grained Image Generation
With recent improvements in generative models, they are
able to generate high-resolution and realistic images. More-
over, these models can be used to learn and disentangle
various latent factors for image synthesis. Style-GAN is
proposed in [26] which disentangles high-level attributes
and stochastic variations of generated images in an unsu-
pervised manner. The model learns an intermediate latent
space from the input latent code, which is used to adjust
style of the image. It also injects noise at each level of the
generator to capture stochastic variations. Singh et al. in-
troduce Fine-GAN [45], a generative model which disen-
tangles the background, object shape, and object appear-
ance to hierarchically generate images of fine-grained ob-
ject categories. Layered Recursive GAN is proposed in
[60], and generates image background and foreground sep-
arately and recursively without direct supervision. Stack-
ing is used in [12, 22, 27, 41, 63] to generate images in
a coarse to fine manner. Conditional fine-grained genera-
tion has been explored in several papers. Bao et al. [5]
introduce a Conditional VAE-GAN for synthesizing images
in fine-grained categories. Modeling an image as a com-
position of label and latent attributes, they vary the fine-
grained category label fed into the generative model, and
randomly draw values of a latent attribute vector. AttnGAN
[59] uses attention-driven, multi-stage refinement for fine-
grained text-to-image generation. Hong et al. [20] present
a hierarchical framework for semantic image manipulation.
Their model first learns to generate the pixel-wise semantic
label maps from the initial object bounding boxes, and then
learns to generate the manipulated image from the predicted
label maps. A multi-attribute conditional GAN is proposed
in [53], and can generate fine-grained face images based on
the specified attributes.
3. Approach
Most of the existing works on unrestricted adversarial
attacks rely on geometric transformations and deformations
[15, 56, 1], which are oblivious to latent factors of vari-
ation. In this paper, we leverage disentangled latent rep-
resentations of images for unrestricted adversarial attacks.
Style-GAN [26] is a state-of-the-art generative model which
learns to disentangle high-level attributes and stochastic
variations in an unsupervised manner. More specifically,
stylistic variations are represented by style variables and
stochastic details are captured by noise variables. Changing
the noise only affects low-level details, leaving the over-
all composition and high-level aspects such as identity in-
tact. This allows us to manipulate the noise variables such
that variations are barely noticeable by the human eye, yet
the synthesized image can fool a pre-trained classifier. The
style variables affect higher level aspects of image genera-
tion. For instance, when the model is trained on bedrooms,
style variables from the top layers control viewpoint of the
camera, middle layers select the particular furniture, and
bottom layers deal with colors and details of materials. This
allows us to manipulate images in a controlled manner, pro-
viding an avenue for fine-grained unrestricted attacks.
Formally, we can represent Style-GAN with a non-linear
mapping function f and a synthesis network g. The map-
ping function is an 8-layer MLP which takes a latent code z,
and produces an intermediate latent vector w = f(z). This
vector is then specialized by learned affine transformations
A to styles y = (ys,yb). Style variables in turn control
adaptive instance normalization operations [21] after each
convolutional layer of the synthesis network g. Noise inputs
are single-channel images consisting of un-correlated Gaus-
sian noise that are fed to each layer of the synthesis network.
Learned per-feature scaling factors B are then used to gen-
erate noise variables η which are added to the output of
convolutional layers. The synthesis network takes style y
and noise η as input, and generates an image x = g(y,η).
We then pass the generated image to a pre-trained classifier
F . We seek to slightly modify x so that F can no longer
classify it correctly. We achieve this through perturbing the
style and noise tensors, which control different aspects of
image generation in a fine-grained manner. More specifi-
cally, we initialize adversarial style and noise variables as
y
(0)
adv = y and η
(0)
adv = η respectively. These adversar-
ial tensors are then iteratively updated in order to fool the
classifier. Loss of the classifier determines the update rule,
which in turn depends on the type of attack. As common
in the literature, we consider two types of attacks: non-
targeted and targeted.
3.1. Non-targeted Attacks
In order to generate non-targeted adversarial examples,
we need to change the model’s original prediction. Starting
from initial values y(0)adv = y and η
(0)
adv = η, we perform
gradient ascent in the style and noise spaces of the generator
to find values that maximize the classifier’s loss. At time
step t, the update rule for the style and noise variables is:
y
(t+1)
adv = y
(t)
adv+  · sign(∇y(t)advJ(F (g(y
(t)
adv,η
(t)
adv)), cx))
(1)
η
(t+1)
adv = η
(t)
adv+δ · sign(∇η(t)advJ(F (g(y
(t)
adv,η
(t)
adv)), cx))
(2)
in which J(·, ·) represents the classifier’s loss function (e.g.
cross-entropy), cx is the ground-truth class for x = g(y,η),
and , δ ∈ R are step sizes. Note that F (·) gives the proba-
bility distribution over classes. This formulation resembles
Iterative-FGSM [29]; however, the gradients are computed
with respect to the noise and style variables of the synthe-
sis network. Alternatively, as proposed in [29] we can use
the least-likely predicted class llx = argmin(F (x)) as our
target:
y
(t+1)
adv = y
(t)
adv− ·sign(∇y(t)advJ(F (g(y
(t)
adv,η
(t)
adv)), llx))
(3)
η
(t+1)
adv = η
(t)
adv−δ ·sign(∇η(t)advJ(F (g(y
(t)
adv,η
(t)
adv)), llx))
(4)
We found the latter approach more effective in practice. We
use (, δ) = (0.004, 0.2) and (0.004, 0.1) in the experi-
ments on LSUN and CelebA-HQ respectively. We perform
multiple steps of gradient descent (usually 2 to 10) until the
classifier is fooled. Unlike I-FGSM that generates high-
frequency noisy perturbations in the pixel space, our pre-
trained generative model constrains the space of generated
images to realistic ones.
3.2. Targeted Attacks
Generating targeted adversarial examples is more chal-
lenging as we need to change the prediction to a specific
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Figure 1: Model architecture. Style (y) and noise (η) variables are used to generate images g(y,η) which are fed to the
classifier F . Adversarial style and noise tensors are initialized with y and η and iteratively updated using gradients of the
loss function J .
class T . In this case, we perform gradient descent to mini-
mize the classifier’s loss with respect to the target:
y
(t+1)
adv = y
(t)
adv −  · sign(∇y(t)advJ(F (g(y
(t)
adv,η
(t)
adv)), T ))
(5)
η
(t+1)
adv = η
(t)
adv − δ · sign(∇η(t)advJ(F (g(y
(t)
adv,η
(t)
adv)), T ))
(6)
We use (, δ) = (0.005, 0.2) and (0.004, 0.1) in the experi-
ments on LSUN and CelebA-HQ respectively. In practice 3
to 15 updates suffice to fool the classifier. Updating only the
noise tensor results in finer adversarial changes, while only
using the style variable creates coarser stylistic changes. We
can also have a detailed control over the generation process
by manipulating specific layers of the synthesis network.
Note that we only control deviation from the initial latent
variables, and do not impose any norm constraint on gener-
ated images.
3.3. Input-conditioned Generation
Generation can also be conditioned on real input images
by embedding them into the latent space of Style-GAN. We
first synthesize images similar to the given input image I by
optimizing values of y and η such that g(y,η) is close to
I . More specifically, we minimize the perceptual distance
[23] between g(y,η) and I . We can then proceed similar
to equations 3–6 to perturb these tensors and generate the
adversarial image. Realism of synthesized images depends
on inference properties of the generative model. In practice,
generated images resemble input images with high fidelity
especially for CelebA-HQ images.
4. Results and Discussion
We provide qualitative and quantitative results demon-
strating our proposed approach. Experiments are performed
on LSUN [61] and CelebA-HQ [25]. LSUN contains 10
scene categories each with around one million labeled im-
ages and 20 object categories. We use all the 10 scene
classes as well as two object classes: cars and cats. We
consider this dataset since it is used in Style-GAN, and is
well suited for a classification task. For the scene cate-
gories, a 10-way classifier is trained based on Inception-v3
[47] which achieves an accuracy of 87.7% on LSUN’s test
set. The two object classes also appear in ImageNet [11],
a richer dataset containing 1000 categories. Therefore, for
experiments on cars and cats we use an Inception-v3 model
trained on ImageNet. This allows us to explore a broader set
of categories in our attacks, and is particularly helpful for
targeted adversarial examples. Note that there are multiple
classes representing cars and cats in ImageNet, so we iden-
tify and group those classes. CelebA-HQ is a high-quality
version of the CelebA dataset [34] consisting of 30,000 face
images at 1024 × 1024 resolution. We consider the gender
classification task, and use the classifier provided by Kar-
ras et al. [26]. This is a binary task for which targeted and
non-targeted attacks are similar.
In order to synthesize a variety of adversarial examples,
we use different random seeds in Style-GAN to obtain var-
ious values for z,w,y and η. Style-based adversarial ex-
amples are generated by initializing yadv with the value of
y, and iteratively updating it as in equation 3 (or 5) un-
til the resulting image g(yadv,η) fools the classifier F .
Noise-based adversarial examples are created similarly us-
ing ηadv and the update rule in equation 4 (or 6). We can
also combine the effect of style and noise by simultane-
ously updating yadv and ηadv in each iteration, and feed-
ing g(yadv,ηadv) to the classifier. In this case, the effect
of style usually dominates since it creates coarser modifica-
tions. To make sure the iterative process always converges
in reasonable number of steps, we measure the number of
updates required to fool the classifier on 1000 randomly-
selected images. In the case of non-targeted attacks on
LSUN, 3.7± 1.8 and 6.8± 3.6 (mean ± std) updates are
required for noise-based and style-based examples respec-
tively. For targeted attacks, we first randomly sample a tar-
get class different from the ground-truth label for each im-
age. In this case, the number of updates required for noise-
based and style-based attacks are 4.5 ± 1.7 and 9.1± 4.2
respectively. For the CelebA-HQ dataset, 6.2 ± 4.1 and
7.3 ± 3.0 updates are needed for noise and style manipu-
lation respectively. While using different step sizes makes
a fair comparison difficult, we generally found it easier to
fool the model by manipulating the noise.
Figure 2 illustrates generated adversarial examples for
non-targeted and targeted attacks on LSUN. Original im-
age g(y,η), noise-based image g(y,ηadv) and style-based
image g(yadv,η) are shown. As we observe, adversar-
ial images look almost indistinguishable from natural im-
ages. This also holds in targeted attacks even when origi-
nal and target classes are very dissimilar. Manipulating the
noise variable results in very subtle, imperceptible changes.
Varying the style leads to coarser changes such as different
colorization, pose changes, and even removing or inserting
new objects in the scene. We can also control granularity
of changes by selecting specific layers of the model. Ma-
nipulating top layers, corresponding to coarse spatial reso-
lutions, results in high-level changes. Lower layers, on the
other hand, modify finer details. In the first two columns of
Figure 2, we only modify top 6 layers (out of 18) to gener-
ate adversarial images. The middle column corresponds to
changing layers 7 to 12, and the last two columns use the
bottom 6 layers.
Figure 3 depicts adversarial examples on CelebA-HQ
gender classification. Males are classified as females and
vice versa. As we observe, various facial features are al-
tered by the model yet the identity is preserved. Similar to
LSUN images, noise-based changes are more subtle than
style-based ones, and we observe a spectrum of high-level,
mid-level and low-level changes. Figure 4 illustrates adver-
sarial examples conditioned on real input images using the
procedure described in Section 3.3. Synthesized images re-
semble inputs with high fidelity, and set the initial values in
our optimization process. In some cases, we can notice how
the model is altering masculine or feminine features. For in-
stance, women’s faces become more masculine in columns
2 and 4, and men’s beard is removed in column 3 of Figure
3 and column 1 of Figure 4.
Unlike perturbation-based attacks, Lp distances between
original and adversarial images are large, yet they are visu-
ally similar. Moreover, we do not observe high-frequency
perturbations in the generated images. The model learns to
modify the initial input without leaving the manifold of real-
istic images. Note that the classifiers are trained on millions
of images, yet they are easily fooled by these subtle on-the-
manifold changes. This poses serious concerns about ro-
bustness of deep neural networks, and reveals new vulnera-
bilities of them. Additional examples and higher-resolution
images are provided in the supplementary material.
4.1. User Study
Norm-constrained attacks provide visual realism by Lp
proximity to a real input. To verify that our unrestricted ad-
versarial examples are realistic and correctly classified by
an oracle, we perform human evaluation using Amazon Me-
chanical Turk. In the first experiment, each adversarial im-
age is assigned to three workers, and their majority vote is
considered as the label. The user interface for each worker
contains nine images, and shows possible labels to choose
from. We also include the label “Other” for images that
workers think do not belong to any specific class. We use
2400 noise-based and 2400 style-based adversarial images
from the LSUN dataset, containing 200 samples from each
class (10 scene classes and 2 object classes). The results
indicate that 99.2% of workers’ majority votes match the
ground-truth labels. This number is 98.7% for style-based
adversarial examples and 99.7% for noise-based ones. As
we observe in Figure 2, noise-based examples do not de-
viate much from the original image, resulting in easier pre-
diction by a human observer. On the other hand, style-based
images show coarser changes, which in a few cases result in
unrecognizable images or false predictions by the workers.
We use a similar setup in the second experiment but for
classifying real versus fake (generated). We also include
2400 real images as well as 2400 unperturbed images gen-
erated by Style-GAN. 74.7% of unperturbed images are la-
beled by workers as real. This number is 74.3% for noise-
based adversarial examples and 70.8% for style-based ones,
indicating less than 4% drop compared with unperturbed
images generated by Style-GAN.
High-level	changes Low-levelMid-level
(a) Non-targeted
(b) Targeted
Figure 2: Unrestricted adversarial examples on LSUN for a) non-targeted and b) targeted attacks. Predicted classes are shown
under each image. First two columns correspond to manipulating top 6 layers of the synthesis network. The middle column
manipulates layers 7 to 12, and the last two columns correspond to the bottom 6 layers.
Figure 3: Unrestricted adversarial examples on CelebA-HQ gender classification. From top to bottom: original, noise-
based and style-based adversarial images. Males are classified as females and vice versa. First two columns correspond to
manipulating top 6 layers of the synthesis network. The middle three columns manipulate layers 7 to 12, and the last two
columns correspond to the bottom 6 layers.
Figure 4: Input-conditioned adversarial examples on CelebA-HQ gender classification. From top to bottom: input, generated
and style-based images. Males are classified as females and vice versa.
4.2. Evaluation on Certified Defenses
Several approaches have been proposed in the litera-
ture to defend against adversarial examples, which can be
broadly divided into empirical and certified defenses. Em-
pirical defenses are heuristic methods designed to mitigate
effects of perturbations, and certified defenses provide prov-
able guarantees on model’s robustness. Almost all of these
methods consider norm-constrained attacks. Most of the
empirical defenses were later broken by stronger adver-
saries [8, 3]. This has led to a surge of interest in provable
defenses. However, most certified defenses are not scal-
able to high-resolution datasets. Cohen et al. [10] propose
the first certified defense at the scale of ImageNet. Using
randomized smoothing with Gaussian noise, their defense
guarantees a certain top-1 accuracy for perturbations with
L2 norm less than a specific threshold.
We demonstrate that our unrestricted attacks can break
the state-of-the-art certified defense on ImageNet. We use
400 noise-based and 400 style-based adversarial images
from the object categories of LSUN, and group all relevant
ImageNet classes as the ground-truth. Our adversarial ex-
amples are evaluated against a randomized smoothing clas-
sifier based on ResNet-50 using Gaussian noise with stan-
dard deviation of 0.5 [10]. Table 1 shows accuracy of the
model on clean and adversarial images. As we observe, the
accuracy drops on adversarial inputs, and the certified de-
fense is not effective against our attack. Note that we stop
updating adversarial images as soon as the model is fooled.
If we keep updating for more iterations afterwards, we can
achieve even stronger attacks. Our adversarial examples
are learned on Inception-v3, yet they can fool a defended
model based on ResNet-50. This indicates that these inputs
are transferable to other models, showing their potential for
black-box attacks. Considering the variety of methods used
for creating unrestricted adversarial examples, designing ef-
fective defenses against them is a challenging task. We be-
lieve this can be an interesting direction for future research.
Accuracy
Clean 63.1%
Adversarial (style) 21.7%
Adversarial (noise) 37.8%
Table 1: Accuracy of a certified classifier equipped with
randomized smoothing on adversarial images.
4.3. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training increases robustness of models by
injecting adversarial examples into training data [18, 35,
29]. This approach makes the classifier robust to perturba-
tions similar to those used in training; however, it can still be
vulnerable to black-box adversarial inputs transferred from
other models [49]. To mitigate this issue, Ensemble Ad-
versarial Training is proposed in [49] to augment training
data with perturbations transferred from other pre-trained
models. The main drawback of adversarial training is that it
degrades performance of the classifier on clean images [35].
Various regularizers have been proposed to tackle this issue
[62, 52].
We show that while adversarial training makes the model
robust to our unrestricted adversarial inputs, it does not de-
grade accuracy on clean images. We perform adversar-
ial training by incorporating generated images in training
the LSUN classifier. 400k clean images as well as 50k
noise-based and 50k style-based adversarial inputs are used
to train the classifier. Same number of samples are used
across all scene categories. Table 2 shows accuracy of
the strengthened and original classifiers on clean and ad-
versarial test images. Similar to norm-constrained pertur-
bations, adversarial training is an effective defense against
our unrestricted attack. However, accuracy of the model
on clean test images remains almost the same after adver-
sarial training. This is in contrast to training with norm-
bounded adversarial inputs, which hurts classifier’s perfor-
mance on clean images. This is due to the fact that unlike
perturbation-based inputs, our generated images live on the
manifold of realistic images as constrained by the genera-
tive model.
Adv. Trained Original
Clean 87.6% 87.7%
Adversarial (noise) 81.2% 0.0%
Adversarial (style) 76.9% 0.0%
Table 2: Accuracy of adversarially trained and original clas-
sifiers on clean and adversarial test images.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
We present a novel approach for creating unrestricted
adversarial examples leveraging state-of-the-art generative
models. Unlike existing works that rely on hand-crafted
transformations, we learn stylistic and stochastic changes
to mislead pre-trained models. Loss of the target classi-
fier is used to perform gradient descent in the style and
noise spaces of Style-GAN. Subtle adversarial changes can
be crafted using noise variables, and coarser modifications
can be created through style variables. We demonstrate
results in both targeted and non-targeted cases, and vali-
date visual realism of synthesized images through human
evaluation. We show that our attacks can break state-of-
the-art defenses, revealing vulnerabilities of current norm-
constrained defenses to unrestricted attacks. Moreover,
while adversarial training can be used to make models ro-
bust against our adversarial inputs, it does not degrade ac-
curacy on clean images.
The area of unrestricted adversarial examples is rela-
tively under-explored. Not being bounded by a norm thresh-
old provides its own pros and cons. It allows us to create a
diverse set of attack mechanisms; however, fair compari-
son of relative strength of these attacks is challenging. It is
also unclear how to even define provable defenses. While
several papers have attempted to interpret norm-constrained
attacks in terms of decision boundaries, there has been less
effort in understanding the underlying reasons for models’
vulnerabilities to unrestricted attacks. We believe these can
be promising directions for future research. We also plan to
further explore transferability of our approach for black-box
attacks in the future.
6. Appendix
We provide additional examples and higher-resolution images in the following. Figure 5 illustrates adversarial examples on
CelebA-HQ gender classification, and Figure 6 shows additional examples on the LSUN dataset. Higher-resolution versions
for some of the adversarial images are shown in Figure 7, which particularly helps to distinguish subtle differences between
original and noise-based images.
Figure 5: Unrestricted adversarial examples on CelebA-HQ gender classification. From top to bottom: Original, noise-based
and style-based adversarial images. Males are classified as females and vice versa.
(a) Non-targeted
(b) Targeted
Figure 6: Unrestricted adversarial examples on LSUN for a) non-targeted and b) targeted attacks. From top to bottom:
original, noise-based and style-based images.
Figure 7: High resolution versions of adversarial images. From left to right: original, noise-based and style-based images.
Figure 7: High resolution versions of adversarial examples. From left to right: original, noise-based and style-based images.
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